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Abstract
The present paper investigates the functioning of an Emission Trading
System (ETS) and its impact on the diﬀusion of environmental-friendly
technological innovation in the presence of ﬁrms’ strategic behaviours and
sanctions to non-compliant ﬁrms. For this purpose, we study an evolutionary game model with random matching, namely, a context in which
a population of ﬁrms interact through pairwise random matchings. We
assume that each ﬁrm has to decide whether to adopt a new clean technology or keep on using the old technology that requires pollution permits
to operate and that the strategy whose expected payoﬀ is greater than
the average payoﬀ spreads within the population at the expense of the
alternative strategy (the so-called replicator dynamics).
We investigate the technological dynamics and the stationary states
that emerge from the model. From the analysis of the model, we show that
by properly modifying the penalty on non-compliant ﬁrms, it is possible to
shift from one dynamic regime to another and that an increase in permits
trade can promote the diﬀusion of innovative pollution-free technologies.

1

Introduction

Emission trading has gained increasing importance in the last years as policy
instrument to reduce several diﬀerent environmental problems.
While the theoretical foundations of the instrument are due to the seminal
contributions by several authors in the ’60s (e.g. Coase 1960, Dales 1968, Montgomery 1972), the ﬁrst examples of applications of Emission Trading Systems
(henceforth ETS) date back to 1995 when they were succesfully implemented
in the context of the US Acid Rain Programme to cut NOx and SO2 emissions
(Coniﬀ, 2009). More recent applications include water tradable permits to lower
pollution and consumption of hydric resources, with diﬀerent results in diﬀerent
countries and hydrological basins (see Borghesi, 2008).
Among recent applications of ETS, a particularly important role is played by
the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for the reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions. As Ellerman (2009) has argued, this scheme, that is the ﬁrst
1
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world’s multinational cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases (GHG) and
has created the largest emissions trading market, represents a benchmark for
the global GHG emissions trading system that is currently proposed as the main
policy instrument to combact climate change in the future (Aldy and Stavins,
2008).
Given the crucial role that the ETS is likely to play in the future international policy agenda, several works have recently investigated its functioning
and implications from diﬀerent perspectives (e.g. Grull and Taschini, 2011;
Convery, 2009; Clò, 2008; Carraro et al., 2010; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007;
Ellerman and Joskov, 2008; Ellerman, 2009; Ellerman et al., 2010; Costantini et
al., 2011). In particular, among these studies a few contributions (e.g. Rogge et
al. 2011; Moreno-Bromberg and Taschini, 2011; Brauneis et al., 2011; Borghesi
et al., 2012; Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2012) have examined whether and to what
extent the ETS contributes to induce technological innovation and diﬀusion in
the regulated sectors. Several authors have analysed the possible existence of
strategic behaviours in the emission trading market (e.g. Hahn, 1984, Hagem
and Westkog, 1998, Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007, Wirl, 2009), while others
have pointed out the possible emerging of moral hazard behaviours generated
from the sanction system in the EU-ETS context (see e.g. Borghesi, 2011) or
the optimal environmental policy when ﬁrms are not compliant (see e.g. Ino,
2011).
The present paper aims at contributing to the increasing literature on this
issue by investigating the functioning of an ETS and its impact on the diﬀusion
of environmental-friendly technological innovations in the presence of strategic
behaviours of ﬁrms, bounded rationality and sanctions to non-compliant ﬁrms.
Diﬀerently from all previous contributions in the EU-ETS literature, the
present paper adopts a random matching model to analyse the issue described
before. The random matching framework is increasingly adopted in game theory
to model markets in which frictions and bounded rationality prevent instantaneous adjustment of the level of economic activity. In particular, following
the seminal contribution by Maynard Smith (1982) (see Hofbauer and Sigmund
1988, Weibull 1995, Samuelson 1997 for an introduction to evolutionary game
theory), several papers have adopted evolutionary game models in which individuals interact with each other during pair wise random matchings. Such a
framework seems to ﬁt and has therefore been applied to many diﬀerent economic contexts and ﬁelds, such as: labor economics (to describe the matching
of unemployed workers and ﬁrms’ vacancies), social economics (e.g. to examine
the formation of marriages from unmatched individuals), monetary economics
(e.g. to analyse the allocation of loans from banks to entrepreneurs, or the role
of money in facilitating sales when sellers and buyers meet), and so on. In the
present context, the random matching structure of the game will be employed
to describe the potential emission trading between heterogeneous ﬁrms that can
decide whether to adopt a clean technology or keep on using an old polluting
technology. The former ﬁrms can sell their own permits to the latter, who need
them to keep on producing to meet the requirements of the ETS and thus avoid
the penalty to non-compliant ﬁrms.
2
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Diﬀerently from other studies in the ETS literature, moreover, we show
that the presence of bounded rationality and imitative behaviors underlying
the random matching model may generate path-dependency in the economy.
When this is the case, the present model allows to perform comparative statics
analyses that show how the basins of attraction of the existing equilibria vary
with changes in key parameters of the model, such as the penalty level to noncompliant ﬁrms. To the best of our knowledge, the possible existence of path
dependency in ETS and the analysis of its dynamic features has been mainly
ignored by the existing literature, therefore it represents a further value added
of the present work as compared to previous studies.
To investigate this issue, the structure of the paper will be as follows. Section
2 describes the model, distinguishing two possible payoﬀ matrices according
to the kind of ﬁrms that interact in random pairwise matchings. Section 3
investigates the dynamics emerging under each of the two possible cases and
analyses the corresponding Pareto ranking among the equilibria of the model.
Section 4 contains some concluding remarks on the main results that descend
from the model.

2

The model

Let us consider a large population of ﬁrms that interact among themselves
through pairwise random matchings. Each ﬁrm has to choose ex ante between
two possible strategies: (i) keep on using an old, polluting technology (with
production cost CP ) and buy the corresponding pollution permits (at price p)
or (ii) shift to a new, environmental-friendly technology that implies higher
production costs (CNP > CP ) but requires no pollution permits to operate.
To ﬁx ideas, let us suppose that each ﬁrm initially has one permit at disposal
and that the ﬁrms that use the polluting technology (henceforth ﬁrms P ) need
two permits to operate, while the ﬁrms that adopt the clean technology (ﬁrms
NP ) need no permit for the activity. If so, ﬁrms P need to buy one more
permit to keep on producing, whereas ﬁrms NP can sell its permit, so that the
conditions for their exchange are obviously satisﬁed.
Let us indicate with T the sanction that a non-compliant ﬁrm P has to
pay if is discovered by the regulatory authority, namely, if it produces with the
old technology without purchasing the additional permit that is needed for this
purpose. We will denote with θ ∈ (0, 1) the probability of being discovered by
the regulatory authority, therefore θT indicates the expected fee for the noncompliant ﬁrms P .
Given the random matching structure of the game, we can obviously distinguish three possible cases depending on the kind of ﬁrms that meet up in
pairwise matchings.
a) If two ﬁrms P meet, then in principle they both have to pay the fee,
since none of them has enough permits to operate. However, they can decide
to exchange their permits (i.e. one ﬁrm P sells its permit to the other that has
thus the two permits that it needs to operate) and share the expected penalty.
3
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In this case, the exchange price is p = θT/2 and the payoﬀs πP of the two ﬁrms
will be:
π P = −CP − θT/2
so that both ﬁrms are better-oﬀ with respect to the no exchange case (in
which they both have the "full" expected penalty θT ).
b) If two ﬁrms NP meet, the permits are useless for both of them so no
permit trade will occur. In this case, the payoﬀs πNP of the two ﬁrms will be:
π NP = −CNP + δ
where δ ≥ 0 denotes the possible positive spillover deriving to each ﬁrm N P
from the diﬀusion of the new technology (e.g. the positive externality in terms
of reduction cost for the new technology that is allowed by the network eﬀects
emphasized by much of the empirical literature on this issue).1
c) If a ﬁrm P meets a ﬁrm N P , the former can buy from the latter the
permit that it needs to avoid the penalty, however the permit exchange may
not take place for diﬀerent reasons. For instance, ﬁrm P might decide not to
buy the permit and run the risk to be sanctioned by the regulatory authority
since it regards the expected penalty to be suﬃciently low. Alternatively, ﬁrm
NP could decide not to sell the permit to damage and/or eliminate ﬁrm P as
it may represent a potential competitor on the market.2
We can, therefore, distinguish two possible subcases within case c:
c.1) No permit exchange occurs between ﬁrm P and N P (because P does
not buy the permit and/or N P does not sell it). In this case, if ﬁrm P is not
discovered (which occurs with probability 1 −θ), the payoﬀs of the two ﬁrms are
simply represented by the costs of their respective technologies (CP and CNP ).
If, on the contrary, ﬁrm P is discovered (which occurs with probability θ) it will
also have to pay the penalty T , while ﬁrm NP may possibly derive a competitive
gain γ from the "punishment" suﬀered from its competitor P .3 In this case,
therefore, the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrms P and N P are given by the probability
that P is actually discovered/not discovered times the corresponding payoﬀs for
each ﬁrm as described above, that is, respectively:
πP
πNP

= θ(−CP − T ) + (1 − θ)(−CP ) = −CP − θT
= θ(−CP + γ) + (1 − θ)(−CNP ) = −CNP + θγ

1 See,

for instance, Borghesi et al. (2012) and the literature cited therein.
similar use of emission permits for strategic purposes has actually occurred in some
applications of ETS. For instance, when a system of water pollution permits was implemented
on the Fox River in Wisconsin, the largest ﬁrms that possessed most of the permits refused
to sell them to the smaller ﬁrms to hinder the growth in the production activity of the latter
(’O Neill et al., 1983).
3 One can interpret γ, for instance, as the increase in the revenues and/or in the market
share accruing to ﬁrm NP from the closing of the non-compliant ﬁrm P or from the acquisition
by NP of some green labelling that increases the number of its consumers who are concerned
with the environmental consequences of the dirty production process used by ﬁrm P .
2A
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where γ ≥ 0 is the competitive gain for NP from "punishing" ﬁrm P.
c.2) The permit exchange does take place and ﬁrms P buys the permit from
ﬁrm N P . In this case, the payoﬀs of the two ﬁrms will simply be, respectively:
πP
πNP

= −CP − p
= −CNP + p

where p is the price of the tradable permit.
Notice that ﬁrm P will obviously be willing to buy the permit only if its
corresponding payoﬀ is higher than the expected payoﬀ from not buying the
permit, namely if:
−CP − p > −CP − θT
or, equivalently, if p < θT .
Similarly, ﬁrm NP will be willing to sell its permit only if the payoﬀ that
it derives from the exchange is higher or at least equal to the expected payoﬀ
from not selling the permit, namely if:
−CNP + p > −CNP + θγ
that is, if p > θγ.
For the permit exchange to actually take place, therefore, the equilibrium
price must range between the minimum willingness to accept of ﬁrm N P and
the maximum willingness to pay of ﬁrm P , that is θγ < p < θT .
We can, therefore, distinguish two possible cases that encompass all the
possible situations described above:
Case 1: If γθ ≥ θT , i.e. γ ≥ T , there cannot exist any equilibrium price that
satisﬁes the conditions above so that no trade will take place between ﬁrms P
and NP . In this case (that encompasses cases a), b) and c.1) discussed above),
the payoﬀ matrix is as follows:

P
P
NP

A :

NP
θT
2

−CP −
−CNP + γθ

−CP − θT
−CNP + δ

Case 2: If θγ < θT , i.e. γ < T , the permit exchange is mutually convenient
for any p ∈ (θγ, θT ). In this case, therefore, summarising the cases a), b) and
c.2) above, the payoﬀ matrix is given by:
P
B

:

P
NP

NP
θT
2

−CP −
−CP − p
−CNP + p −CNP + δ
5
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For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the equilibrium price sets half
way between the minimum willingness to accept of ﬁrm N P and the maximum
willingness to pay of ﬁrm P , that is:4
θγ + θT
γ+T
=θ
2
2
If so, the payoﬀ matrix B becomes:
p=

P
C

:

P
NP

−CP − θT
2
−CNP + θ γ+T
2

NP
−CP − θ γ+T
2
−CNP + δ

In what follows we will examine the dynamics and the equilibria that emerge
under each payoﬀ matrix and the possible shifts in the dynamic regimes from
one case to the other (i.e. from matrix A to matrix C) that may derive from
changes in the parameter values of T and γ.

3

Dynamics of the game

Let us indicate with x(t) ∈ [0, 1] the share of ﬁrms that adopt strategy P at
time t ∈ [0, +∞). As a consequence, 1−x(t) denotes the share of ﬁrms adopting
the alternative strategy N P . Variable x represents, therefore, the distribution
of the two strategies in the population of ﬁrms; if x = 1 (respectively, x = 0)
then all ﬁrms adopt strategy P , that is, they all keep on using the polluting
technology (respectively, all ﬁrms adopt strategy NP , i.e. they all shift to the
clean technology).
At any time t a large number of pairwise matchings occur between ﬁrms that
randomly interact.
Given the random maching structure of the game, x (respectively, 1 − x)
measures the probability of "meeting" a ﬁrm that has adopted strategy P (respectively, N P ).
Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the adoption process of the two
strategies can be described by the well-known replicator dynamics (see Weibull
1995):
·

x = x(1 − x) [ΠP (x) − ΠNP (x)]

(1)

where ΠP (x) and ΠNP (x) indicate the expected payoﬀs of strategies P and
·
·
NP , while x denotes the time derivative of x(t), namely, x = dx(t)/dt. According to replicator dynamics, the strategy whose expected payoﬀ is greater
4 This is equivalent to assuming that ﬁrms P and NP have the same bargaining power.
If this is not the case, the equilibrium price will obviously tend towards one extreme or the
other of the range of values (θγ, θT ) according to the respective importance and bargaining
power of the two ﬁrms.

6
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than the average payoﬀ spreads within the populations at the expense of the
alternative strategy, namely:
·

x

3.1

0 iﬀ ΠP (x) − ΠNP (x)

0, ∀x ∈ (0, 1)

(2)

Dynamics of the game when the payoﬀ matrix A applies

If γ ≥ T , the payoﬀ matrix A applies (i.e. tradable permits are exchanged only
between ﬁrms P but not between heterogeneous ﬁrms, P and N P ). In this case,
the expected payoﬀs for the two strategies are as follows:

ΠP (x) = (−CP −

θT
θT
)x + (−CP − θT )(1 − x) = −CP − θT +
x
2
2

ΠNP (x) = (−CNP + γθ)x + (−CNP + δ)(1 − x) = −CNP + δ + (γθ − δ)x
so that the replicator dynamics become:
·

x = x(1−x) [ΠP (x) − ΠNP (x)] = x(1−x) CNP − CP − θT − δ +

T
−γ θ+δ x
2
(3)

where T2 − γ < 0, since γ ≥ T .
Notice that the payoﬀ ΠP (x) is a strictly increasing function of the share of
polluting ﬁrms x: in fact, the higher is the share of polluting ﬁrms, the higher
the probability for a ﬁrm P to meet a similar ﬁrm and thus share the expected
penalty ( θT
2 ) rather than having to pay it all (θT ) as it occurs when it meets a
ﬁrm N P .
Also observe that the payoﬀ ΠNP (x) is a strictly increasing function of x if
γθ − δ > 0, while it is strictly decreasing if γθ − δ < 0. This is also consistent
with what one would reasonably expect: if for a ﬁrm NP the expected gain
from meeting a ﬁrm P (γθ) is higher than the gain from meeting another ﬁrm
NP (δ), then its payoﬀ will increase with the number of ﬁrms P . The opposite
obviously occurs if the sign of the relationship between γθ and δ is reversed.
Notice that if δ = 0, that is, the meeting of two ﬁrms NP does not generate any
positive spillover for each of them, then only the former condition can apply and
the payoﬀ ΠNP (x) is always strictly increasing in the share of polluting ﬁrms x.
As one easily observe from equation (3), the payoﬀ diﬀerential ΠP (x) −
ΠNP (x) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in x if T2 − γ θ + δ is positive (negative). As shown below, we will therefore distinguish two possible cases in the
description of the dynamics of the model according to the sign of the previous
expression.
The following Proposition illustrates the taxonomy of the dynamic regimes
that may occur in the context γ ≥ T .
7
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Proposition 1 When γ ≥ T , dynamics (3) can lead to the following possible
dynamic regimes:
1) If CNP − CP ≥ max θT + δ, θ T2 + γ , then whatever the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the steady state
x = 1 (see Figure 1).
2) If CNP − CP ≤ min θT + δ, θ T2 + γ , then whatever the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the steady state
x = 0 (see Figure 2).
3) If θ T2 + γ < CNP − CP < θT + δ and T2 − γ θ + δ > 0, then there
exists a repulsive inner steady state:
x := (CP − CNP + θT + δ) /

T
− γ θ + δ ∈ (0, 1)
2

If x(0) ∈ [0, x), then x converges to the steady state x = 0, while if x(0) ∈
(x, 1], then it converges to the steady state x = 1 (see Figure 3).
4) If θT + δ < CNP − CP < θ T2 + γ and T2 − γ θ + δ < 0, then whatever
the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the
inner steady state x ∈ (0, 1) in which the alternative strategies P and NP coexist
(see Figure 4).

Figure 1: Whatever the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x
converges to the steady state x = 1. Parameter values δ = 2, γ = 130, θ = .4,
CNP = 115, CP = 42, T = 100.

8
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Figure 2: Whatever the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x
converges to the steady state x = 0. Parameter values δ = 2, γ = 130, θ = .4,
CNP = 45, CP = 42, T = 100.

Figure 3: Bi-stable dynamic regime (path-dependence): if x(0) ∈ [0, x),
then x converges to the steady state x = 0, while if x(0) ∈ (x, 1], then it
converges to the steady state x = 1. Parameter values δ = 50, γ = 130, θ = .4,
CNP = 125, CP = 42, T = 100.

9
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Figure 4: Coexistence dynamic regime: whatever the initial distribution of
strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x always converges to the inner steady state x ∈ (0, 1)
in which the alternative strategies P and N P coexist. Parameter values δ = 2,
γ = 130, θ = .4, CNP = 95, CP = 42, T = 100.
The Proposition above suggests that there can be multiple equilibria of the
game: two extreme equilibria (x = 0 and x = 1) in which all ﬁrms adopt the
same (clean and dirty, respectively) technology and an inner equilibrium that
can be either repulsive or attracting. In the former case, the system is pathdependent: the trajectories of the economy may lead to one extreme or the
other depending on the initial distribution of polluting ﬁrms in the population
so that the technolgical adoption strategy is self-enforcing. In the latter case the
trajectories will lead to an attracting equilibrium in which both technological
adoption strategies coexist.
Notice that the bi-stable dynamics characterizing case 3 above can occur if
and only if T2 − γ θ + δ > 0, namely, only if the payoﬀ diﬀerential ΠP (x) −
ΠNP (x) is strictly increasing in x, which generates a self-enforcing mechanism
leading to extreme equilibria.5 On the contrary, the coexistence regime characterizing case 4 above can occur if and only if T2 − γ θ + δ < 0, namely, the
payoﬀ diﬀerential ΠP (x) − ΠNP (x) is downward sloping in x.
The following Proposition describes how a change in θ and/or T modiﬁes
the inner equilibrium value x.
Proposition 2 In the context γ ≥ T , if θ T2 + γ < CNP − CP < θT + δ and
T
∂x
∂x
2 − γ θ + δ > 0 (bi-stable regime), then ∂T > 0 and ∂θ > 0. If
5 Since γ ≥ T , observe that for the condition above to apply it must be δ > 0, that is, a
positive spillover must derive from diﬀusion of the new technology.

10
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θT + δ < CNP −CP < θ
∂x
then ∂T
< 0 and ∂x
∂θ < 0.

T
2

+ γ and

T
2

− γ θ + δ < 0 (coexistence regime),

The above Proposition suggests that an increase in θ and/or T shifts the
repulsive inner equilibrium x to the right, thus enlarging the attraction basin
of the "virtuous" equilibrium x = 0 in which no ﬁrm pollutes any longer. The
opposite applies when the inner equilibrium x is an attractor: in this case an
increase in the expected penalty (due to higher penalty level T and/or higher
probability of being discovered θ by the regulatory authority for non-compliant
ﬁrms) shifts x to the left, thus increasing the share of non-polluting ﬁrms at the
equilibrium.
In what follows, we intend to point out the possible Pareto dominance relationships between the stationary states of the dynamic system analysed above.
For this purpose, let us consider that the average payoﬀ of the population of
ﬁrms is given by:
Π(x) = x · ΠP (x) + (1 − x) · ΠNP (x)
Therefore Π(1) = ΠP (1) and Π(0) = ΠNP (0) hold. When the two extreme
equilibria x = 0 and x = 1 are both attractors, it seems important to emphasize
under which conditions the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are higher in x = 0 than in x = 1.
This occurs when:
ΠNP (0) > ΠP (1)
i.e.:
−CNP + δ > −CP −

θT
2

which can be rewritten as follows:
θT
+ δ > CNP − CP
2
Therefore if the cost diﬀerential CNP − CP between the clean and the dirty
technologies is suﬃciently low, then both the ﬁrms and the citizens are betteroﬀ in x = 0 than in x = 1: the former because they get a higher payoﬀ,
while the latter because they live in a non-polluted environment. Notice that
the condition above requires that the expected penalty θT and/or the spillover
eﬀect δ are suﬃciently high so that all ﬁrms are highly motivated to shift to the
clean technology.
If, on the contrary, the condition above does not apply, then the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs
are higher in x = 1 than in x = 0, while the opposite applies for the citizens, at
least in terms of their beneﬁts from a clean environment.6
6 Notice that in the present model we focus attention on the ﬁrms’ proﬁt rather than on
the welfare of the whole collectivity. However, given the many and well-documented health
damages provoked by environmental degradation (cf. WHO, 2005), it seems reasonable to

11
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3.2

Dynamics of the game when the payoﬀ matrix C applies

If γ < T , the payoﬀ matrix C applies (i.e. tradable permits are exchanged not
only between homogeneous ﬁrms P , but also between heterogeneous ﬁrms, P
and N P ). In this case the expected payoﬀs are:
θT
θT
)x + (−CP − p)(1 − x) = −CP − Ep + Ep −
2
2
γ+T
γ
= −CP − θ
+θ x
2
2

ΠP (x) = (−CP −

x=

ΠNP (x) = (−CNP + p)x + (−CNP + δ)(1 − x) = −CNP + δ + (Ep − δ)x =
γ+T
−δ x
= −CNP + δ + θ
2
and the replicator dynamics become:
·

x = x(1 − x) [ΠP (x) − ΠNP (x)] = x(1 − x) CNP − CP − δ − Ep + δ −
= x(1 − x) CNP − CP − δ − θ

γ+T
θT
+ δ−
2
2

θT
2

x

x =
(4)

Notice that the payoﬀ function ΠP (x) is always strictly increasing in x so
that the polluting strategy is self-enforcing.7 The payoﬀ of the non-polluting
technology ΠNP (x) is, instead, strictly increasing in x if θ γ+T
2 − δ > 0, namely,
)
sold
to
ﬁrm
P
is higher than the
if the price of the tradable permits (θ γ+T
2
beneﬁt gained from meeting a ﬁrm N P (δ). Stated diﬀerently, in this case the
payoﬀ of ﬁrm NP increases with x since the ﬁrm NP is more likely to meet a
ﬁrm P which makes it better oﬀ. The opposite obviously applies if the price
of the tradable permits sold to ﬁrm P is lower than the spillover eﬀect from
meeting a ﬁrm N P .
The payoﬀ diﬀerential ΠP (x)−ΠNP (x) is strictly increasing in x if δ− θT
2 > 0,
strictly decreasing if δ − θT
<
0.
This
is
consistent
with
our
apriori
intuition:
if
2
the beneﬁt obtained by the matching of two ﬁrms N P (δ) are higher than that
argue that citizens would be better-oﬀ in a perfectly clean world (x = 0) than in an extremely
polluted one (x = 1). The opposite result will obviously emerge when the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
higher in x = 1 than in x = 0 (i.e. ΠN P (0) < ΠP (1)). In that case, the ﬁrms’ interests are
likely to conﬂict with the welfare of society as a whole. The welfare analysis of the whole
collectivity, however, goes beyond the scope of the present paper. We therefore leave it for
future extensions of the present work.
7 This occurs because, if γ > 0, the price that a ﬁrm P pays when it buys the pollution
permit from another ﬁrm P ( θT
) is higher than what it pays when it buys it from a ﬁrm NP
2
(θ γ+T
).
2
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from the meeting of two ﬁrms P ( θT
2 ), then the payoﬀ of the former ﬁrms grow
faster than that of the latter as ﬁrms NP spread through the population. The
opposite obviously applies if δ is lower than θT
2 .
The following Proposition illustrates the taxonomy of the dynamic regimes
that may occur in the context γ < T .
Proposition 3 When γ < T , dynamics (4) can lead to the following possible
dynamic regimes:
γ
, then whatever the initial
1) If CNP − CP ≥ max θ γ+T
2 + δ, θ T + 2
distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the steady state
x = 1 (see8 Figure 1).
γ
2) If CNP − CP ≤ min θ γ+T
, then whatever the initial
2 + δ, θ T + 2
distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the steady state
x = 0 (see8 Figure 2).
θT
3) If θ T + γ2 < CNP − CP < θ γ+T
2 + δ and δ − 2 > 0, then there exists
a repulsive inner steady state:
x = CP − CNP + δ + θ

γ+T
2

/ δ−

θT
2

∈ (0, 1)

If x(0) ∈ [0, x), then x converges to the steady state x = 0, while if x(0) ∈
(x, 1], then it converges to the steady state x = 1 (see8 Figure 3).
γ
θT
4) If θ γ+T
2 + δ < CNP − CP < θ T + 2 and δ − 2 < 0, then whatever the
initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), x will always converge to the inner
steady state x ∈ (0, 1) in which the alternative strategies P and N P coexist (see8
Figure 4).
Notice that, as occurred under matrix A, even in the present context a
bi-stable (path-dependent) dynamic regime takes place only if the spillover parameter δ is suﬃciently high (more precisely, δ > θT
2 , see case 3 above).
As it clearly emerges from the Proposition above, the dynamic regimes that
may occur with matrix C (when permits are traded between heterogeneous
ﬁrms) are similar to those that result from matrix A (when permits are traded
only between polluting ﬁrms), although under diﬀerent parameter values. In
both cases (in particular under cases 3 of Propositions 1 and 3), we can have a
bi-stable dynamics so that hysteresis takes place in the model. This implies that
two economies that take part to the same ETS and undergo the same legislation
in terms of sanctions to non-compliant ﬁrms may lead to two opposite outcomes
(x = 0 where none pollutes or x = 1 where everyone pollutes) depending on
the share of ﬁrms x(0) that initially adopt the new technology N P . On the
contrary, when cases 4 of Propositions 1 and 3 apply, the dynamics emerging
from the payoﬀ matrices A and C are independent of the initial conditions and
8 Please note that altough the referred ﬁgures in the statement are related to the matrix
A, from a qualitative point of view they can ﬁt also for the cases under scrutiny.
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there always exists a unique steady-state that is globally attractive (x = 0,
x = 1, or x = x).
It is important to emphasize that -ceteris paribus- a rise in the penalty level
T shifts the economy from the regime analyzed in Proposition 1 (case γ ≥ T )
to that of Proposition 3 (case γ < T ), thus increasing the overall number of
transactions in the ETS as it induces also ﬁrms P and N P to exchange permits.
The following Proposition describes how the inner equilibrium identiﬁed in
Proposition 3 is modiﬁed by a change in the penalty level and/or in the monitoring capacity of the regulatory authority that aﬀects the probability to discover
non-compliant ﬁrms.
Proposition 4 In the context γ < T , if θ T + γ2 < CNP − CP < θ γ+T
2 +δ
θT
∂x
∂x
and δ − 2 > 0 (bi-stable regime), then ∂T > 0 and ∂θ > 0. If
γ
θT
θ γ+T
2 + δ < CNP − CP < θ T + 2 and δ − 2 < 0 (coexistence regime),
∂x
∂x
then ∂T < 0 and ∂θ < 0.
When a bi-stable dynamics regime applies (case 3 of Proposition 3 above),
an increase of T raises the value of the repulsive inner steady-state x, therefore
it increases the basin of attraction of x = 0 with respect to that of x = 1.
Stated diﬀerently, when the system is path-dependent an increase of T raises
the likelihood that the system may converge to the steady state x = 0 (where
all ﬁrms adopt the non-polluting technology N P ).
When the inner steady-state x is globally attracting (case 4 of Proposition
3 above), an increase in T reduces the value of x. In other words, in this case
a rise in the penalty level (that shifts the system from matrix A to matrix C)
increases the share of non-polluting ﬁrms N P at the equilibrium.
In both cases, therefore, a rise in the penalty level implemented by the
regulatory authority that increases permits trade tends to promote the diﬀusion
of the new non-polluting technology, as it increase either the attraction basin of
the totally clean outcome (x = 0) or the share of clean ﬁrms at the equilibrium.9
The same applies to an increase in the monitoring eﬀort/ability of the regulator that raises the value of θ, thus making more diﬃcult for non-compliant
ﬁrms to escape the sanction.
Finally, it is important to underline that the dynamics of the economy may
lock the system into a "poverty-trap". As a matter of fact, in some cases the
dynamic regime may lead the system towards the "dirty" steady-state x = 1,
although the ﬁrms’ proﬁts would be higher in the "clean" steady-state x = 0,
in which also the overall collectivity would most likely be better-oﬀ. To show
that this may be the case, consider Proposition 3. In this context, we have:
ΠNP (0) > ΠP (1)
for:
9 Notice

that, when γ = T , the two matrices A and C coincide so that they have the same
inner equilibrium x. As a consequence, the comparative statics results concerning x described
in the previous Propositions hold true even when an increase in T shifts the regime from
matrix A to matrix C.
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−CNP + δ > −CP − θ

T
+ θγ
2

or equivalently when:
θ

T
−γ
2

+ δ > CNP − CP

(5)

Recalling that the condition for a bi-stable dynamics under Proposition 3 is:
γ+T
γ
< CNP − CP < θ
+δ
(6)
2
2
it turns out that the two conditions (5) and (6) can simultaneously apply if:
θ T+

θ T+

γ
2

<θ

T
−γ +δ
2

that is, if:
θ

T
3
+ γ
2
2

<δ

This condition suggests that if the positive spillover eﬀect δ that ﬁrms N P
enjoy when they meet on the market is suﬃciently large, then all ﬁrms would be
better-oﬀ by adopting the new technology but the bi-stable dynamics may still
lead the economy in the opposite direction if many ﬁrms are initially reluctant
to change technology and keep on using the old one (i.e. if x(0) is initially above
the repulsive inner equilibrium x).10 In other words, in this case the economy
may end up in a situation that is Pareto-dominated for the ﬁrms and most likely
also for the society as whole.

3.3

Dynamics of the game when θ is endogenous

So far, we have assumed that the monitoring capacity of the regulatory authority and thus the probability θ of non-compliant ﬁrms of being discovered is
exogenously given. However, this may not be the case. In fact, the monitoring
capacity and eﬀort of the regulatory authority in discovering and sanctioning
non-compliant ﬁrms can actually be endogenously determined by the number
of polluting ﬁrms that the authority has to control. In this section we intend
to analyse how results may change if we account for this possibility by endogenising the probability θ. For this purpose, we will focus on the case in which
heterogeneous ﬁrms can exchange emission permits (matrix C above).11
1 0 Notice that a positive technological spillover δ is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
to satisfy the condition above, since such a spillover has to be suﬃciently high for this to
occur.
1 1 A similar analysis can obviously be performed also in the case of matrix A. We omit it
for space reasons and prefer to focus on matrix C since in this latter case the permit market
is more extended as it includes also the trade between ﬁrms P and NP .
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Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the probability that a noncompliant ﬁrm P is actually discovered by the regulatory authority is a linear
function of the overall share of polluting ﬁrms, that is:
θ(x) := a + bx
where: a ≥ 0, b ≷ 0 and 0 ≤ a + bx ≤ 1 ∀x.
Notice that we intentionally imposed no apriori condition on the sign of
the parameter b. In fact, an increase in the share x of polluting ﬁrms may have
conﬂicting eﬀects on the monitoring capacity of the regulatory authority, so that
the sign of b is apriori ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher is the share of
polluting ﬁrms, the lower is the probability for each of them of being discovered
if it keeps producing without purchasing the additional emission permit that is
requested by law (b < 0). On the other hand, the higher is the share of polluting
ﬁrms, the higher is likely to be the monitoring eﬀort of the regulatory authority
and thus also the probability for non-compliant ﬁrms of being discovered (b > 0).
Assuming θ(x) := a + bx, the expected payoﬀs become:
γ+T
γ
(a + bx) + x(a + bx) =
2
2
γ+T
1
γ
−CP − a
+ (aγ − b(γ + T )) x + b x2
2
2
2

ΠP (x) = −CP −

γ+T
(a + bx) − δ x =
2
γ+T
γ+T 2
+δ+ a
−δ x+b
x
2
2

ΠNP (x) = −CNP + δ +
= −CNP

therefore, the following replication dynamics apply:
·

x = x(1 − x) CNP − CP − δ − a

γ+T
γ+T
T
+ δ−b
−a
2
2
2

T
x − b x2
2

(7)

Observe that the graphs of the payoﬀ functions ΠP (x) and ΠNP (x) are given
by two convex (U-shaped) parabola if b > 0, while they can be represented as
two concave (bell-shaped) parabola if b < 0. Both parabola, therefore, have a
minimum (respectively, maximum) that may lie or not within the interval (0, 1).
The payoﬀ diﬀerential:

f (x) := CNP − CP − δ − a

γ+T
γ+T
T
+ δ−b
−a
2
2
2

T
x − b x2
2

is a concave parabola if b > 0, whereas is a convex parabola if b < 0.
It follows that we can have two steady-states in (0, 1), x1 and x2 , with
x1 < x2 . In such case, if b > 0, we have four steady-states, x = 0 and x2
16
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being attractive, while x = 1 and x1 are repulsive (see Figure 5); if, on the
contrary, b < 0 we still have the same four steady states but with opposite
stability properties: x = 0 are x2 repulsive, while x = 1 and x1 are attractive
(see Figure 6).
Observe that it is:
f(0) = CNP − CP − δ − a

γ+T
<0
2

(8)

for CNP − CP < δ + a γ+T
and:
2
f (1) = CNP − CP − (a + b)

γ
+T <0
2

(9)

for CNP − CP < (a + b) γ2 + T .
Also notice that the value of x that maximizes f (x) (if b > 0) or minimizes
f(x) (if b < 0) is the solution of the following equation:
f ′ (x) = δ − b

γ+T
T
− a − bT x = 0
2
2

namely:
xe =

T
δ − b γ+T
2 −a2
bT

where xe > 0 when:
δ−b

T
γ+T
− a ≷ 0 if b ≷ 0
2
2

(10)

while xe < 1 when:
δ−b
3.3.1

γ+T
T
− a ≷ bT
2
2

if b ≷ 0

(11)

Case b > 0

When b > 0, the necessary and suﬃcient condition to have 4 steady-states is
that conditions (8)-(11) are simultaneously satisﬁed and that f(xe ) > 0 also
holds.
Among this set of conditions, (10)-(11) jointly ensure that the value of x
that maximizes f(x) lies in the interval (0, 1), namely xe ∈ (0, 1) iﬀ:
γ
T
γ
T
+ (a + b) < δ < b + (a + 3b)
2
2
2
2
which can also be expressed in terms of the penalty T as follows:
b

2δ − bγ
2δ − bγ
<T <
a + 3b
a+b

(12)
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provided a + b = 0.12

·

Figure 5: Graphes of x corresponding to two diﬀerent values of CNP −CP ,
that give rise to two diﬀerent dynamic regimes; in one regime, the steady states
x2 and x = 0 are locally attracting, in the other the steady state x = 0 is
globally attracting. The dotted line refers to the cost diﬀerence CNP − CP = 31
the continuous line to the cost diﬀerence CNP −CP = 31.5 The other parameter
values are a = 0.4, b = 0.3, T = 47, δ = 22 γ = 3.
The remaining conditions (8), (9) and f(xe ) > 0, that are needed to have
4 steady states, are all dependent on the cost diﬀerence between the two technologies CNP − CP . More precisely, as can be clearly seen from conditions
(8)-(9), the cost diﬀerence between the clean and the dirty technology must
be suﬃciently low to have the dynamic regime with four equilibria described
in the section above. In fact, an increase in the diﬀerence CNP − CP shifts
upwards the concave parabola f (x). A relatively low increase in the cost of the
two technologies moves the attracting equilibrium x2 to the right (thus raising
the number of polluting ﬁrms at the equilibrium) and the repulsive equilibrium
x1 to the left (which reduces the attraction basin of the "virtuous" equilibrium
x = 0), which is consistent with what one would reasonably expect. But if the
increase in the diﬀerence CNP − CP is very high, the parabola may shift above
the horizontal axis, so that there is no longer any inner equilibrium. Figure 5
·
shows two graphes of x, corresponding to diﬀerent values of CNP − CP , that
give rise to two diﬀerent dynamic regimes; in one regime, the steady states x2
and x = 0 are locally attracting, in the other the steady state x = 0 is globally
attracting.
Summing up, when b > 0, if the diﬀerence in the technological costs is
suﬃciently low and the penalty level has intermediate values as described above,
1 2 Notice

that it is always a + b ≥ 0 since we have: 0 ≤ a + bx ≤ 1 ∀x.
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then we can have 4 steady states, that is, a path-dependent economy with one
inner equilibrium x2 in which the two strategies P and N P coexist.
3.3.2

Case b < 0

A similar reasoning applies in the case b < 0. When b < 0, we have 4 steadystates iﬀ: f (0) > 0, f(1) > 0, f (xe ) < 0 and xe ∈ (0, 1). The former three
conditions crucially depend on the diﬀerence CNP − CP (that has to be suﬃciently high for the vertical intercept of the curve to be positive as well as its
value at x = 1). As to the latter condition xe ∈ (0, 1), it is easy to check that
it holds iﬀ:
2δ − bγ
2δ − bγ
<T <
a+b
a + 3b
Thus, when b < 0, if the diﬀerence in the technological costs is suﬃciently
high and the penalty level has intermediate values as described above, we have
4 steady-states with opposite stability features with respect to the case b > 0,
namely: x = 0 and x2 repulsive, while x = 1 and x1 are attractive.
a + 3b > 0 and

·

Figure 6: Graphes of x corresponding to two diﬀerent values of CNP −CP ,
that give rise to two diﬀerent dynamic regimes; in one regime, the steady states
x1 and x = 1 are locally attracting, in the others, the steady state x = 1 or
x = 0 are globally attracting. The dotted line refers to the cost diﬀerence
CNP − CP = 23.5, the continuous line to the cost diﬀerence CNP − CP = 22.
The other parameter values area = 0.7, b = −0.3, T = 47, δ = 4, γ = 3.
Observe that an increase in the cost diﬀerence CNP −CP shifts the attracting
equilibrium x1 to the right (thus increasing the share of polluting ﬁrms P at
the equilibrium) and the repulsive equilibrium x2 to the left (which extends the
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attraction basin of x = 1 where pollution is maximum). This seems consistent
with our intuition: the higher is the cost of the clean technology with respect to
the polluting technology, the lower is the number of ﬁrms that decide to invest in
the new technology and the more attractive is the "business-as-usual" solution
in which ﬁrms prefer to keep on using the traditional polluting technology.
Even in this case, however, if the increase in the cost diﬀerence CNP − CP is
remarkably high, the parabola will shift above the horizontal axis, so that the
inner coexistence equilibria x1 and x2 cease to exist and there remains only one
·
attracting equilibrium, x = 1.Figure 6 shows two graphes of x, corresponding to
diﬀerent values of CNP − CP , that give rise to two diﬀerent dynamic regimes;
in one regime, the steady states x1 and x = 1 are locally attracting, in the other
the steady state x = 1 is globally attracting.

4

Conclusions

The present paper has examined how the implementation of an ETS may aﬀect
the diﬀusion of new environmental-friendly technologies, taking into account
both the penalty to non-compliant ﬁrms established in the ETS and the possible
strategic behaviour of single ﬁrms. For this purpose, we have set up and analysed
an evolutionary game model with random matching. While this framework
does not aim to be necessarily realistic (although it ﬁts many contexts, possibly
including also the pairwise meetings in local ETS), it allows to explain learning
processes and to emphasize speciﬁc mechanisms that may derive from strategic
interaction among economic agents.
As shown in the paper, we can have two alternative payoﬀ matrixes depending on the relationship between two crucial parameters, T and γ, that capture
the penalty level and the incentive of clean ﬁrms to act strategically, respectively. In one case, only polluting ﬁrms exchange permits among themselves,
whereas in the other case permits can be traded between heterogeneous ﬁrms
(polluting and non-polluting). We have shown that by properly increasing the
penalty level the regulatory authority can shift from one dynamic regime to the
other (i.e. we can pass from the former to the latter case) and that an increase
in permits trade promotes the diﬀusion of innovative pollution-free technologies
at the equilibrium.
In both cases, morever, multiple equilibria emerge from the model, with dynamics leading either to extreme equilibria or to inner equilibria. When the
dynamics lead to extreme equilibria, all ﬁrms imitate the others and select the
same (polluting or non-polluting) strategy. When they converge to an inner
attracting equilibrium, then there coexist heterogeneous choices in the population of ﬁrms, with some ﬁrms that adopt the clean technology and others that
remain with the old polluting technology. When the inner equilibrium is, instead, a source (i.e. a repulsive steady state), the system is characterized by
path-dependency. This suggests that in a context characterized by bounded
rationality and imitative behaviours as the one described in this paper, the initial share of innovative ﬁrms that adopt the new non-polluting technology may
20

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper730

20

Antoci et al.: ETS and Technological Innovation: A Random Matching Model

play a key role in determining the ﬁnal outcome of the ETS. If the dynamic
trajectories are path-dependent, in fact, two economies that take part to the
same ETS and undergo the same penalty system (as it occurs, for instance, in
the European ETS) might end up in opposite situations as to the diﬀusion of
the new technology depending on the initial share of non-polluting ﬁrms.
Finally, the number of possible equilibria can further increase (up to four
alternative steady-states) if we assume that the probability of discovering noncompliant ﬁrms is not exogenously given, but rather a function of the number
of polluting ﬁrms. In any case, whatever the number of possible equilibria, it is
also possible to rank them and analyse which one Pareto-dominates the others.
Further research will be needed in the future to deepen the present analysis.
In particular, it would be desirable to extend the evolutionary game proposed
here from pairwise random matchings to the case of n ﬁrms possible meetings,
so that each ﬁrm can simultaneously match up and exchange permits with any
other ﬁrm in the market rather than with a single ﬁrm. This would strengthen
the realism of the model, potentially adding further complexity to the possible
dynamics that derive from it.
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